In October 1962, China and India waged a war to contest the demarcation of their shared border, a culmination of years of escalating hostilities between the two governments. One month later, after overwhelming the Indian military, the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire. By contrast, seven years earlier at the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, leaders from each country signed pledges for peace and mutual non-aggression. Speeches by Indonesian host and president Sukarno, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai imparted on attendees, most of whom represented newly decolonized countries, a sense of cautious optimism for their collective advancement. However, the "Bandung spirit" dissipated by 1965, as evidenced by the cancellation of the Second Asian-African Conference in Algeria. While most scholars focus on the Sino-Soviet Split and 1965 Algerian coup to explain the Bandung spirit's rupture, I study the 1962 border war and failed mediation efforts by neutralist governments, like Indonesia, as evidence of the Asian-African alliance's early fracturing. Drawing from primary sources such as English and Indonesian language newspapers, Indian, Chinese, and Indonesian government documents, and the writings of Indian and Indonesian politicians, I argue that Indonesians advocated for a stricter definition, relative to Nehru, of anti-imperialism tinged with Asian nationalism. Indonesian leaders’ reluctance to defend Nehru, their partner at Bandung, demonstrate that the Sino-Indian War exposed ideological differences between India and Indonesia, thus facilitating the Bandung Spirit’s demise. By framing the war with the Bandung Conference, I explore how governments fall short of their lofty visions of anti-imperialism and perpetuate the nationalistic hierarchies they originally eschew.