The Supreme Court of the United States is required to interact with outside actors as it fulfills its duty of interpreting the law. These actors, including interest groups and the Solicitor General, often provide the Court with information regarding the political and social effects of their decisions. Throughout the past century, the relationship between interest groups and the Supreme Court has changed due to increased ideological and political polarization across the country. These increases have escalated the amount of partisan-oriented amicus curiae, or friend-of-the-court, briefs submitted to the Court. As the Court receives more information from partisan-oriented organizations, I hypothesize that the litigant that receives the most amici support will also receive the support of the Court. This hypothesis stems from the Court’s historical agreement with the desires of public opinion, due to its lack of enforcement power, causing the Court to rule in favor of the amicus groups that are believed to mirror public interests. Amicus briefs, historically meant to provide factual information, have begun to reflect the effects of partisan polarization by working to persuade the Court to decide in a particular direction. By assessing the influence of amicus briefs on the Court’s civil rights decisions following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, my research highlights the effects that both liberal and conservative-oriented interest groups have on civil rights jurisprudence. My research separates civil rights cases into 11 issue-areas, including discrimination, prison rights, and women’s rights. By conducting a multivariate analysis, I account for the effects of amicus briefs and several control variables, including the president’s and Congress’s ideologies, on the Court’s decisions. My preliminary results build on research conducted in the late 1990s by indicating the decreased efficacy of amicus briefs and increased effects of partisan ideology and public opinion on the Court.