Are corporations creatures of the state, or merely “legal shorthand” for the contractual embodiment of shareholders’ property rights? Might a corporation be something else entirely — a discrete, rights bearing entity, separate from both shareholders and the state? These questions have characterized debates over corporate theory for the last two centuries of North American legal thought, influencing the development of three main theories of the corporation. This article seeks to contextualize these arguments, providing substantive analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) corporate legal jurisprudence. Specifically, I engage in systematic inquiry of the Court’s caselaw to answer the question: how has the Supreme Court of Canada developed corporations as rights-bearing entities since the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms? To answer, I develop a dataset containing 24 cases brought before the SCC, in which a litigating party’s status as a corporation or business entity was of material importance to the Court’s decision to extend a Charter right (or not). These cases range in date from 1984 to 2020, and cover a diverse range of controversies arising under the Charter. I code each case for the Charter right in question and a variable measuring the Court’s development of a theory of corporation, along with descriptive characteristics of the case, enabling me to map change over time. Findings reveal a cautious, if not paradoxical, judiciary — the Court is at once willing to extend some constitutional rights to corporations, while simultaneously reluctant to acknowledge that corporations deserve protections coextensive with human ones. Rather than signaling incoherence, the Court’s approach implies the reconceptualization of a new, fourth approach to corporate theory. Importantly, this research suggests that the “nexus of contracts” paradigm popularized by scholars in the 1980s has become less relevant to the SCC, suggesting new avenues of corporate legal inquiry.