Unionization has been proven to give significant benefits for workers, specifically in terms of wages and employee benefits. However, in spite of these benefits, unionization has been on the decline in the United States since the 1960s. One of the main reasons for this decline is right-to-work (RTW) laws, which allow employees to opt out of paying union dues that contribute to the cost of union representation. This poses an interesting puzzle: why are RTW laws enacted in the United States, in spite of the negative economic effects towards workers? My research attempts to examine the relationship between a state’s ‘economy’ and RTW laws. I theorize that RTW laws, while hurting employees, provide a significant incentive to firms who are looking to relocate. Therefore, states with a lower gross state product (GSP) may be incentivized to institute a RTW law. I first look at GSP per capita to identify if there are cases where GSP stagnated, and then a RTW law was enacted. I then analyze the 8 most recent cases of RTW laws, using state data from 1965 to 2019 to look at the impacts of RTW laws on GSP, employment, median household income, and unionization. This is done using a multivariate regression analysis, to test the correlation between the passing of the RTW law and my dependent variables. Ultimately, this study hopes to both build on the existing body of evidence that asserts a negative relationship between both RTW states and unionization, and research additional effects of RTW laws beyond unionization by focusing on state economic development, and incentives around proposing a RTW law.