In 1997, South Korea and many other Asian countries were hit with a large currency and financial crisis, with the IMF providing a $58 billion bailout program to South Korea involving large amounts of reforms and corporate restructuring involved, along with a very contractionary fiscal and monetary policy that intensified the crisis. The IMF loan had conditions of higher interest rates, higher taxes, and lower government spending, among others, on hopes that the contractionary policies will restore the foreign investors’ faith in Korea. After the crisis, the conditions of the IMF loan have been subject to much criticism in both Korea and abroad. This raises a question as to whether the IMF’s response and the conditions of the loan to Korea was appropriate for the situation. For this research, I am collecting information from many sources both from the US and in Korea, including books, journals, and newspapers. I am also acquiring various types of data as part of the research. Some of my findings are that the IMF’s response for the crisis was inappropriate as the IMF’s diagnosis of the situation was inappropriate. It is because South Korea’s situation was different from the other countries of the Asian Financial Crisis as the crisis did not arise due to overvalued exchange rates and government debt. Additionally, part of the IMF’s response in Korea can be said of as carrying over from past crises which involved the government accumulating large amounts of debt, as opposed to the Korean case, where the chaebol and the financial institutions lending to them accumulated large amounts of short-term debt and the government had almost no debt and was operating at a balanced budget. The uniqueness of the Korean crisis meant that the IMF should have reacted differently in imposing its conditions for the loan.