The Cold War, according to many historical studies, did not really start until the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, but it was during the postwar period from 1945 to 47 that the image of the United States we know today was born. It is only through understanding this new iteration of the US empire that one can understand the Cold War. To u colloquial expression, the postwar was the horse the Cold War rode in on. Of Washington's postwar policies, few are more illuminating than those propagated by the American Military Government in Korea. The American Military Occupation of Korea from 1945 to 1947 was characterized by a series of contradictions. Of the myriad of contradictions, four in particular were of special importance. The first was the way American Military and officials in the State Department framed occupation by the American Military Government (AMG) in terms of independence and liberation. The second was the way the AMG advocated and championed free speech while simultaneously censoring the press. The third was the shifting roles of communism and US-Soviet relations, which were deemed simultaneously threatening and non-existent. The last was the way the AMG constantly advocated for Korean political participation in liberal democracy, while also determining Koreans unfit for democracy. Through an examination of these four contradictions, I will explore the relationship between the image the US government created for Korea and the new image and role the US government created for the United States, which has marked US foreign policy ever since.

The North Korean nuclear crisis is severe, with North Korea having developed missiles potentially armed with nuclear weapons that can reach the continental US. However, the international response has mainly been ineffective in stopping North Korea. Additionally, South Korea’s new attitude going towards negotiation with North Korea is an important game-changer. Through this research, I plan to explore the questions of why the international sanctions have been ineffective, how South Korea’s changing attitude can influence this issue, and what can be done to solve this issue completely. For this research, I have collected information from many sources both from the US and in Korea, including books, journals, and newspapers. Some of my findings are that there are loopholes to the sanctions, especially China not enforcing the sanctions and trading key goods with North Korea, especially oil. Additionally, the Moon Jae-In administration’s new strategy towards the issue, going more towards negotiation, may be catastrophic and must stop immediately. To solve this issue, South Korea must stop doing peace talks with North Korea, as such talks were catastrophic during the past, and stay on the same page with the US to motivate China from not trading with North Korea, especially oil which is crucial to its survival, as North Korea cannot produce its own oil. This may be enough to force North Korea to denuclearize. A better solution is to assassinate the dictator of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, which will lead to disorder in North Korea as Kim Jong Un does not have a successor currently, and South Korea and the US can use this opportunity to destroy the weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. This research is crucial for maintaining the peace and security not only in the East Asia region, but also for the entire world.

Nuclear coercion rests on the threat of force to compel a demand. Some strategists contend that nuclear coercion does not work between nuclear adversaries. The theory of the nuclear revolution posits that military victory is not possible in the nuclear era, and therefore military power cannot advance political ends. Others maintain that nuclear coercion is indeed possible, and the nuclear balance of power between adversaries shapes political outcomes. This study explores whether strategic superiority generates coercive leverage in crisis bargaining. It employs a qualitative case study analysis of Soviet decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis to test rival theories of nuclear strategy.

Before the Battle of Lepanto on October 7, 1571, the Republic of Venice’s relations with the Ottoman Empire were tumultuous and tentative. As the most powerful Mediterranean maritime force in the 16th century, it was Venice’s mission to protect Christendom from Ottoman Islamic armies. To fight this maritime crusade Venice employed privateers and corsairs, individuals who, in exchange for payments, supplied their own vessels to police the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean in search of Ottoman vessels. Since Venice relied on trade for basic provisions, Venetian authorities approached naval aggression as a necessary defensive measure. Venice’s lack of self-sustainability meant that protecting its imperial holdings was critical to the longevity of the city itself. As Venice won the Battle of Lepanto, destroying the Ottoman fleet, Venetians regained their sense of naval supremacy. Although Venice lost the larger Ottoman-Venetian war, as in the three previous was, the Battle of Lepanto marked a pivotal moment in Mediterranean history, driving Venetians to recapture some of what they had lost and to rebuild their once vast merchant empire. Confident in their naval prowess, Venice’s merchant galleys spread far and wide across the Eastern Mediterranean to forge new trade relations with the Ottoman Empire. Through these relations, Venice portrayed themselves as the gateway to the East by supplying themselves and Western Europe with exotic goods. I argue that The Battle of Lepanto ushered in a new era of economic expansionism grounded in a Venetian sense of naval superiority that allowed Venice to end its reliance on privateering and corsairing to protect its empire.

Rather than assuming the transhistorical existence of Kurdish nationalism, this paper identifies and explains the material motivations behind the formation of the short-lived Mahabad Republic in 1946. I argue both the tribal chiefs and urban elites of Kurdish society felt compelled to break from Tehran as they, along with the rest of Kurdish society, became more connected to a wider economy than ever before. Previous political movements within Kurdish society against unjust treatment from the Iranian central government had been led by the tribal chiefs whose hegemony over the rural areas had made them powerful forces to be reckoned with. In 1946, with the tribal chiefs undermined by anti-tribal policy from Tehran, and the urban population and wealth in Kurdish society growing at a rapid rate, the Mahabad separatist movement emerged as the first Kurdish rebellion to be directed and inspired by the urban elite. Yet the success of the movement still necessitated the cooperation of the landholding tribal elite, as they provided the military organization crucial for victory. Both groups, who held the bulk of power within Kurdish Iran, were motivated by adverse treatment associated with the Iranian state, including manifest corruption, cultural oppression, and economic recession. In that context, I argue, the landholding tribal chiefs and the emergent urban elite forged a secession movement away from Iran to establish the first successful Kurdish ethno-state.

Every nation state has its foundational stories and Afghanistan is no exception. Classical historiography and national myth contend that the Durrani Empire, founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, marked the beginning of the modern Afghan nation-state. As the fledgling polity subsumed all of present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan in addition to parts of Iran and the Central Asian republics, it found itself the object of ‘The Great Game’ in which the expanding Russian and British empires sought to control the region. I assert that, while it is certain that 'The Great Game' and Ahmad Shah influenced the growth of Afghan nationalism, traditional historiography fails to account for the deliberate, ruler-driven work that went into the Afghan centralization project. Rather than playing pieces propelled through their early centuries on a vast geopolitical Great Game board, the Shahs of the Durrani Empire and the Emirs of the Emirate of Afghanistan determinedly enacted policies furthering their goals and visions for the state. Concurrently, British India, governed by the Council of India, sought to shape the Afghan state to suit its own needs vis-a-vis Russia and Persia. I also maintain that while the early stages of the nation building project were a response to the political and military needs of Ahmad Shah, the relative power of each state shaped the later phases. The Durrani Empire initially had a military advantage, but later British territorial annexations in India facilitated power projection further into Central Asia, thereby imposing their image of Afghanistan over its local population. I argue fundamentally that Afghan national identity was shaped through a shifting relationship with Britain as a consequence of successful as well as abortive policy decisions from both parties which, when combined with the framework established by early Durrani rulers, coalesced to give form to Afghan nationalism.