There is a noticable lack of research done in epistemology with regards to the role of the passions (or emotions). Epistemology asks questions about what knowledge is and how we come by acquiring knowledge. Due to these types of questions, the focus is put on reason and justification. However, there is also an aspect of normativity: what methodology ought one to use in order to acquire knowledge? Given recent findings in experimental psychology, it is odd that an examination of the passions' role in normativity is less prominent in epistemology. My presentation is about my recent research into the role passions play in questions about knowledge acquisition and more specifically the normative aspects of knowledge acquisition. My primary way of doing this is not solely a review of experimental psychology literature, but also an examination of the 18th Century philosopher David Hume's work on the passions and normativity. I will show how an accurate interpetation of Hume's work is relevant to epistemological issues, and how his work can inform contemporary debates around normativity more generally. 

My research concerns itself with the metaphysics of free will. To posit, as some philosophers do, that free will and determinism are incompatible is to provide a necessary condition for free will. Yet what should a sufficient condition look like? In other words, how might indeterminists provide a positive account of free will? In section 2 of my paper, I provide a few definitions and discuss an influential argument against compatibilism, namely the view that free will and determinism are compatible. This will help to identify some important criteria for theories of free will. Section 3 shows how abandoning determinism and adopting indeterminism is also problematic, and that we thus need to fill in the definition of free will. Section 4 presents the first part of Robert Kane’s definition of free will, which goes along the lines of "we make choices based on our beliefs, priorities, etc." and section 5 offers Kane’s account of Self-Forming Actions to explain how our beliefs and priorities are our own. The core of my objection will take place in section 6, where I show how the concept of a Self-Forming Action cannot make free will compatible with indeterminism in that the idea of a Self-Forming Action is incoherent.

Philosophy research and teaching pedagogy are usually approached, in much of Western academia, through a method focused on rational, explicit argument. However, many other fields privilege the role of emotion in decision making and suggest that non-argumentative methods, such as stories, discussion, or implicit argument more closely represent our natural cognitive processes. This alternate approach has important implications for the field of philosophy that are worth exploring further. My research seeks to address several questions: How might stories, discussion, and implicit argument represent our everyday cognitive processes more accurately than rational, explicit argument? Why might doing philosophy without arguments be important? When, conversely, might a focus on rational, explicit argument (which brings clarity in form, a shared method among different philosophical communities, and rigorous writing and critical-thinking skills) be the better choice? What kinds of questions are best addressed by what means? These questions will be examined by a combination of methods: 1) literature review (focusing on Feyerabend’s arguments against strict, methodological rules; Bicchieri’s research on norms and beliefs; and data from neurobiological studies on the role of emotion in decision-making), 2) contrastive analysis of personal experience using different approaches to philosophy in different contexts (during interactions with children in Philosophy for Children programs; and by employing non-directive tutoring strategies in writing center tutoring practices), and 3) non-structured interviews with other participants in these educational programs. Preliminary findings suggest that non-argumentative methods of doing philosophy can be more effective in promoting social and personal change. Presentation participants will be invited to explore the question of what should be the implications of these findings for philosophy research and teaching pedagogy.