The Greek sovereign debt crisis has required controversial bailouts, austerity measures that have caused Greek citizens to riot in the streets, and tense political negotiating in the Eurozone. However, it is only one part of a larger problem of economic stability and political unity facing the European Union (EU) today. My research, then, seeks to answer three main questions: (1) what were the causes of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, (2) what are the potential policy solutions to the Greek debt problem, and (3) what are the implications of these policy proposals on the future of the European Union as a whole? Using an institutionalist approach, which emphasizes the role of institutions in determining the rational decisions of political actors, I analyze both the policies of the EU (in bailing out and financially strengthening Greece) and the institutional defects of the Eurozone (i.e., the European Central Bank has limited power and banking regulations are still national). I evaluate proposed solutions according to which would present the greatest benefits for the fewest costs, in terms of democratic legitimacy, economic competitiveness and efficiency, and political feasibility. My research finds that the Greek debt crisis was caused largely by incentives created by the European political environment and by the institutional structure of the EU’s Economic Monetary Union. Thus, to move forward, the EU must take an active role in restructuring its institutions to promote both economic and political convergence. Correspondingly, it must develop strong political leadership, a polity that identifies with the European project, and a democratic process that provides democratic legitimacy without forgoing its technocratic efficiency.